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I.   INTRODUCTION  
Lack of economic development, stagnant growth, procedural ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency, rent seeking, and bureaucratic capture in public programs are common features 
of many developing and transition economies.2 Cross-country studies find that corruption is 
detrimental to capital accumulation, growth, and poverty reduction (Mauro, 1995; Kaufmann 
and Kraay, 2002). At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that corruption, once 
entrenched, is difficult to eliminate; for example, see Andvig and Moene (1990), Dabla-
Norris and Freeman (2004), and Mauro(2004).3 Future reform programs designed to combat 
corruption and improve public sector efficiency may benefit from a better understanding of 
why corruption persists. 
 
The importance of taking account of the institutional settings and incentive structures for 
fighting corruption is increasingly recognized both by practitioners (World Bank, 1997; IMF, 
2003, 2005) and theoreticians (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; and 
Dabla-Norris, 2002). However, there is often a gap between theory and practice. Since the 
seminal contributions of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978), corruption 
has often been studied in a principal-agent framework where the principal (the government or 
citizens) tries to motivate the agent (public agency) to be honest in an environment of 
incomplete information. Theoretical studies generally aim to find the optimal contract or 
allocation that reduces corruption but fail to take account of the practical constraints actually 
faced by the principal. Practitioners often base their prescriptions on country experiences but 
lack an adequate analytical framework to guide their decisions.  
 
The objective of this paper is to bridge this gap by developing a simple analytical framework 
that reflects realistic constraints faced by many developing and transition economies. We 
argue that the ineffectiveness of traditional incentives can explain the persistence of 
corruption and policy distortions in these countries. The traditional principal-agent literature 
relies on two types of incentive tools, “carrots,” such as premiums for good performance, and 
“sticks” or penalties. More specifically, the literature suggests that corruption can be 
eliminated by increasing penalties, raising the probability of conviction, or by paying 
informational rents or efficiency wages (Mookherjee and Png, 1995; Basu and others, 1992; 
                                                 
2 One consequence of rent seeking is that productive resources are diverted toward 
inappropriate activities, resulting in a misallocation of resources in the economy. For 
instance, agents may have higher incentives to allocate productive resources to rent seeking 
rather than to production activities (Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris, 2005), and government 
officials may endogenously increase the amount of red tape in order to extract more rents 
(Banerjee, 1997).  
3 In this paper, we use the terms corruption and rent seeking interchangeably, while 
acknowledging that the latter is more general than the former. 
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Besley and McLaren, 1993). However, we argue that these solutions assume away the 
problems encountered in many parts of the world. 
 
Attempts to utilize the “stick” strategy are frequently ineffective in many developing and 
transition countries. For instance, the political will or capacity to engage in monitoring and 
implement appropriate strategies may be lacking, or the legal and financial institutions, such 
as the judiciary, police, and financial auditors, required to enforce and enhance accountability 
in the public sector are weak (Rauch and Evans, 2000). Efficient legal and financial systems 
rely on a functioning enforcement mechanism, and the ability to delegate investigation and 
reviews to a trustworthy audit and legal machinery. In many developing and transition 
economies, in particular those characterized by systemic corruption, the institutional 
framework lacks credibility and is itself plagued by problems of corruption, so conventional 
mechanisms to control corruption, such as audits and legislative reviews, may be 
insufficient.4 Moreover, collusion, organizational deficiencies, abuse, and lack of 
responsiveness to citizens’ needs cannot easily be detected and rectified even with the best of 
supervision. Therefore, when institutions are weak, the government’s potential role as auditor 
and supervisor is even more constrained. Moreover, if the “stick” strategy is of little value in 
such situations, using the “carrot” strategy may not be feasible in practice as well, because in 
many of these countries official wages are often bounded and cannot be state-dependent, or 
information premiums are not conceivable.5 
 
If traditional incentives are not effective, what can be done? Observing the persistence and 
stability of rent capture systems in many developing and transition countries, which have 
resisted considerable reform attempts, the paper argues that this reflects a stable equilibrium, 
resting on a social consensus between the different stakeholders. Our working hypothesis is 
that such a stable equilibrium, in turn, reflects the existence of multiple constraints that are 
binding simultaneously. As a result, relying on standard incentive tools to relax a single 
constraint at a time may neither be feasible, nor effective. In this environment, we argue that 
traditionally “external” factors (to direct public sector management, tools generally 
considered as decision variables in principal-agent models), especially enhanced 
transparency, can play an important role.  
 
The distortions characteristic of many developing countries (e.g. rent seeking, corruption, 
procedural ineffectiveness) can frequently be traced to imperfections in political markets that 
                                                 
4 The significant interrelationship between legal ineffectiveness and corruption suggests that 
strong forces tend to perpetuate corruption. For example, Damania and others (2004) show 
that, in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce 
compliance with regulations are weak, which, in turn, increases incentives for rent-seeking 
behavior, resulting in a higher level of noncompliance with existing regulations.  
5 For instance, Di Tella and Schargodsky (2002) argue that when control mechanisms are too 
weak or too strong, wages do not have any impact on corruption. 
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are greater in some countries than in others (IMF, 2005). Incomplete information is at the 
heart of most theories of the breakdown of political markets. For instance, since uninformed 
voters cannot easily identify the effect of rent seeking on their welfare, politicians may have 
greater scope to extract rents (Keefer and Khemani, 2005). More specifically, the lack of 
transparency in rules, laws, and processes, and of effective institutional controls, are often 
advanced as contributing factors leading to corruption, and empirical evidence suggests that 
this may indeed be the case. Recanatini and others (2005) find that maintaining open and 
transparent procedures, including publicly announced budget and personnel decisions, is 
associated with lower corruption in public agencies. Using survey data on Bolivia, Kaufmann 
and others (2002) show that transparency has a larger effect on the quality of service delivery 
and corruption than the more traditional type of public sector management variables. 
 
This paper examines the different channels through which transparency can contribute to 
reducing rent capture and increasing public output, in a situation where traditional incentives 
fail. We adopt an inductive analytical approach, by developing a coherent theory out of 
extensive theoretical and empirical evidence related to different strands of literature, 
including economic analysis of corruption, principal-agent theory, as well as sociological 
studies. Specifically, we develop a stylized model that draws upon a large body of theoretical 
and empirical work on corruption and reflects some realistic constraints faced by 
governments in developing and transition economies. We then summarize existing empirical 
evidence and country case studies to illustrate the effect of transparency on our model’s 
constraints. 
 
We argue that greater fiscal transparency and increased public access to information can 
allow for an insider-driven, “owned” mutation to better social outcomes. This argument is in 
line with recent initiatives by international financial institutions (IFIs) to enhance fiscal 
transparency across their member countries. For instance, IMF-supported programs 
frequently include measures designed to address institutional weaknesses, reduce 
opportunities for corruption and other forms of rent seeking, and promote good governance 
more generally (IMF, 2003).6 More generally, the IMF’s involvement is aimed at increasing 
the transparency of government activities, the effectiveness of public resource management, 
and the stability and transparency of the environment in which the public sector operates.7 
                                                 
6 Examples of such conditionality in IMF-supported programs include steps to strengthen 
revenue and customs administration (e.g. Bolivia and Armenia) and expenditure management 
(e.g. Azerbaijan and Côte d’Ivoire). In some instances, such as in Cambodia and Kenya, 
programs have had to address corruption that have important macroeconomic implications 
(IMF 2003). 
 
7 The Fund’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and regular assessments of 
fiscal management practices through Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs) rest on the following general principles of fiscal transparency: clarity of roles and 
responsibilities; public availability of information; open budget preparation, execution, and 
reporting; and assurances of integrity. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a simple model of public production 
and rent seeking, and outlines the various constraints faced in some developing and transition 
countries. Section III presents the theoretical results and explains the economic rationale 
behind our assumption that the constraints may be simultaneously binding. In Section IV, we 
explain how transparency can relax the different constraints at stake. Section V concludes. 
 
II.   A STYLIZED MODEL 
We construct a simple model where a benevolent principal representing the population or 
citizen aims to optimize the public output, which is produced by a representative public 
agent.8 One can also think of this relationship in terms of the legislature, or other governing 
body employing the agent, such as a line ministry or planning bureaucracy, to identify needs 
for expenditures, and then accordingly allocate funds, the disbursement of which is overseen 
by the agent.  
 
The public agency can exert effort either to produce the public output ( 1e ), or engage in self-
interested rent seeking (including corrupt) activities ( 2e ), with total effort normalized to one 
( 1 2 1e e+ = ).9 Rent seeking entails a “sunk” cost 0 1α≤ ≤ , so that the total rent appropriated 
by the agent is equal to ( ) 21R eα= − .The assumption of a sunk cost to rent seeking captures 
the idea that rent seeking entails waste, resources spent on competition over possible rents 
(Buchanan et al,1980) or other directly unproductive, profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati 
1980). 
 
The public output produced depends on the agent’s effort along with other factors, such as 
productivity, cost of provision of public services, denoted by θ . As in Sarte (2001), θ  can be 
regarded as capturing some private information that the agent has with respect to the 
technology used to produce public goods.10 For instance, the average cost associated with the 
                                                 
8 We do not differentiate between outputs, outcomes, and results, and use these terms 
interchangeably. 
9 Such rent seeking is not exclusive to the government sector or to developing countries. 
Dickens and others (1989) provide some examples of employee crimes in the United States, 
showing that rent seeking by workers can generate large financial losses in many industries. 
They report that as much as 80 percent of shipping losses in the freight and airport cargo-
handling industries arises from employee theft; 30 percent of retail employees steal 
merchandise from the workplace or misuse discount privileges; 27 percent of hospital 
employees steal hospital supplies; and 9 percent of workers in manufacturing falsify their 
time cards. 
10 Niskanen (1991) notes that the primary advantage of a bureau is that it has much better 
information about the costs of supplying the public service than does the principal. More 
(continued…) 
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provision of government services can be random and its realization costlessly observable 
only to the agent; however, it is not directly observable by the principal, who only knows its 
distribution. For simplicity, we consider an additive productive function and assume that 
public output, x, where 1x e θ= + , is publicly observable at no cost. However, θ , 1e , and 
hence, 2e  and R , are the agent’s private information. 
 
The agent is paid an official wage w. In addition, we assume that he derives some “internal” 
utility, denoted by ε , from providing the public output. This assumption reflects the fact that 
agents, and in particular bureaucrats, are not exclusively materially self-interested. They can 
also be motivated by public service motivation (Perry and Wise, 1990), intrinsic motivation 
for the job performed (Frey, 1997), and social motivation like enhanced prestige and power 
from the production of the public good (see Paul and Robinson, 2005, on these issues).  
 
The principal knows that the production process may be subject to rent seeking, and can 
engage in costly monitoring. We denote as C  the cost of controls implemented by the 
principal. For simplicity, we regard control costs as being proportional to the amount of 
effort expended by the principal. The expected penalty inflicted on the agent when caught, Π, 
is assumed to be a function of the principal’s control effort and the size of the captured rent. 
This penalty can be viewed as fines, the probability of loosing future employment 
opportunities, loss of promotion, or imprisonment. 
 
Assumption 1: The penalty function is of the form ( ) ( ) 22 2, 1C R CR C eαΠ = = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , with 
( )0, 0RΠ = ; ( ),0 0CΠ = ; ( ) 221 0eC α




2 1 0C e
e





α∂ Π = − >∂ .  
 
This formulation implies that the expected penalty is zero in the absence of rent seeking and 
if the principal is not investigating corruption; and it is increasing in the principal’s control 
effort and in the size of the rent captured by the agent. Moreover, the penalty function 
exhibits less tolerance for higher levels of corruption.11  
                                                                                                                                                       
generally, we can think of the agent as using his powers of information collection and 
expenditure oversight to either manipulate the principal or to extract rents for himself. For 
example, in preparing an itemized budget for submission to the principal, he can spend more 
effort identifying attractive infrastructure projects from which he can extract rents relative to 
identifying pressing needs for social expenditures than the principal would in his place. 
11 A general functional form that satisfies these desired properties is ( ),C R C Rφ ϕΠ =  for any 
0φ >  and 1ϕ > . 
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the agent’s expected utility is an additive function 
of his wage, internal motivation, and rents appropriated, minus the expected penalty: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 ,U w e e C Rε θ α= + + + − −Π  (1) 
 
The principal’s objective is to maximize the public outcome, net of wages, and control 
costs:12 
 
 ( ) 1E X e w Cθ= + − −  (2) 
 
Two remarks are worth making at this stage. First, rent capture is socially inefficient. Other 
things being equal, the loss incurred by society when 1 1e <  is equal to 1 21 e e− = , while the 
benefit to the agent of exerting effort less than 1 to producing the public output equals 
( ) ( ) ( )2 11 , 1e C R eα ε− −Π − − . The net social loss is thus equal to ( ) ( )2 ,e C Rα ε+ +Π , 
which is always positive (it is zero at 1 1e = ). Second, while the principal’s objective function 
is increasing in 1e , the effect of an increase in 1e  on the agent’s utility is ambiguous.
13 As 
long as it is positive, the principal’s and the agent’s interests are aligned, and the agent exerts 
effort to produce the public output. However, an agency problem arises when ( )1/ 0U e∂ ∂ < , 
in which case the agent will increase his effort devoted to rent seeking activities. 
 
In a standard principal-agent model, the principal acts as a Stackleberg leader offering a 
contract that maximizes his objective function, taking into account the agent’s reaction 
function. The contract must also fulfill a participation constraint for it to be accepted by the 
agent. In this framework, the agent’s participation constraint (PC) takes account of the 
implicit rent accruing to the agent, and may be written as   
 
*U u≥        (PC) 
 
where *u  represents the agent’s reservation utility. Note that if official wages are bounded, 
the agent’s utility could encompass some illegal, but socially accepted rent capture. The 
principal would thus opt for “capitulation wages,” i.e. wages below reservation wages, that 
                                                 
12 Note that, as we have assumed total effort to be normalized to one, we abstract from 
“disutility of work” in the agent’s utility function. 
13 Note that the derivative of (1) with respect to e1, ( ) ( ) ( )2 11 1 2 1 1/ C eU e ε α α= − − + − −∂ ∂ , 
can either be positive or negative depending on the underlying parameter values. 
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attract only the dishonest agents, rather than raise wages to the high levels required to deter 
corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Dabla-Norris, 2002). 
 
We assume the public agency is also subject to what we call a “minimum eequirement 
constraint” (MRC). 
 
Assumption 2: The relationship between the public agency and the principal is regulated 
through implicit social consensus, such that the agency is required to produce at least a 
certain amount of the public good. 
 
Our MRC attempts to capture the idea that it is socially tolerated that the public agent 
captures some rents for its network, but only if it provides at least a certain minimum level of 
public good for the whole population. This assumption constitutes a crucial postulate of our 
paper. It reflects the fact that in close-knit societies, corrupt behavior on the part of public 
officials is frequently tolerated or sanctioned by the population. Sociological studies of 
corruption provide several explanations for this tolerance. In many of these countries, society 
is organized along patronage networks, where individuals benefit from various types of 
“redistribution” (direct transfers, protection in hard times, nepotism, etc.) from their patrons. 
These networks function on the basis of a series of reciprocal “gift exchanges” between 
patrons and clients (Mauss, 1923) and corruption networks, ranging from petty to high-level 
corruption, are intertwined (see Blundo 2001 for the example of public procurement in 
Senegal). Corruption then becomes institutionalized and structural, such that the state is held 
hostage by various social and political segments (Bako-Arifari 2001). As a result, day-to-day 
corruption becomes legitimized by the social and economic environment within which 
individual agents operate (Blundo and de Sardan, 2001).14  
 
Another explanation for the tolerance of corruption in some societies lies in the nature of 
foreign aid. For instance, to the extent that the provision of the public good is partially 
financed by external donors, rent capture in public projects may be socially acceptable, 
because that money is viewed as “cold,” not domestically owned and subject to 
accountability to the local population, as opposed to money “warmed” by social relationships 
(Poncelet and others, 2005).15 As a result of these factors, corruption maybe socially accepted 
by the population—but only up to a point, since there must be an equilibrium between the 
different networks in place. This is particularly the case where the central government is 
weak and made up of a coalition of polarized factions (Easterly, 2001). Therefore, in 
                                                 
14 A study of corruption in Senegalese hospitals states that rent extraction practices are 
tolerated and legitimized by society (see http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-87470-201-1-
DO_TOPIC.html ). Another explanation lies in the social importance of “big men,” whose 
power and wealth is a factor of pride for their networks (Medard, 1992). 
15 Martens and others (2002) note that foreign aid funds are subject to a “broken feedback 
loop” which reduces accountability.  
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compliance with a social consensus negotiated with the population, the agent implicitly 
accepts to produce at least a certain level of public outcome, which we call Y . The MRC is 
given by: 
 
( ) 1E x e Yθ= + ≥      (MRC) 
 
In exchange for producing the public good, the population agrees that the agent should 
receive some minimum utility.16 This is captured in PC, the participation constraint. We view 
the two minimum requirements, *u  and Y, as the outcomes of a negotiation process between 
the agent and the population. While we do not explicitly model this process, their respective 
levels can be viewed as depending on the bargaining power of each actor. Note also that, as 
they are implicitly negotiated, these requirements could be context-specific. For instance, in 
the event of an observable adverse productivity or other exogenous shocks (presumably a 
low θ , for instance following a drought) both parties may be more tolerant and accept a 
lower Y  and *u .  
 
Finally, in addition to the participation constraint, we assume that the principal also has to 
satisfy a budget or cash constraint, which states that the expenditures devolved to pay the 
agent and exert controls cannot be higher than a cash ceiling B : 
 
w C B+ ≤       (BC) 
 
Standard principal-agent models rely on incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which state 
that the agent’s expected utility when behaving honestly should be greater or equal to what 
he may expect if he shirks.17 Introducing ICs in our framework would require us to specify 
output-dependent transfers, and thus the distribution of θ , which would complicate the 
model. We do not follow this approach for two reasons. First, the results from this approach, 
the traditional efficiency and rent extraction trade-off, are already well-known in the 
literature (for example, see Laffont and Martimort, 2002). More important, this paper is 
based on the premise that many of the traditional incentive tools considered in the literature 
may not be enforceable in the context of developing and transition economies.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that rent seeking is reduced when firms pay higher wages, for 
example, see Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), and  Goldsmith and others, (2000), notably 
                                                 
16 In a similar vein, Akerlof (1982) examines the idea that labor contracts are partial gift 
exchanges. In his model, workers’ efforts depend on the work norms of their group, so that 
the firm can succeed in raising group work norms and average effort by paying workers a gift 
of wages in excess of the minimum required. 
17 The Revelation Principle asserts that the principal cannot do better than offering an 
incentive-compatible contract. 
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because more competitive salaries might reduce incentives to take bribes or engage in other 
types of rent seeking behavior, given the reduction in the marginal utility of income and 
increase in the disutility of being fired if one is caught engaging in corrupt activity. However, 
in the absence of adequate controls, very large increases in wages would be required to 
eradicate corruption solely by raising wages, which could be incompatible with a tight budget 
constraint.18 Moreover, the principal may have little ability to relate the wage to observed 
outcomes if official wages are bounded and if reliable information on performance is lacking. 
As a result, neither pay-for-performance nor efficiency wages are possible in this situation. 
The principal would thus lack the usual “carrot” incentive, and as a result may resort to 
offering capitulation wages. 
 
Moreover, the principal may also lack an adequate “stick” incentive, as ineffective judicial 
systems and weaknesses in the rule of law imply that actual penalties for civil servants are 
very low or ineffective in many developing countries (Moussa, 2004; Lienert 2003). In 
reality, one might also expect oversight and monitoring to be more difficult in economies 
where rent seeking is pervasive (Kaufman et al, 2002; IMF, 2005). In essence, substantial 
resources would have to be spent to monitor a bureaucracy that is deeply entrenched in a 
culture of corruption. By contrast, monitoring might be more easily carried out when there 
already exists little tolerance for rent seeking. Under this interpretation, the increase in C 
required to reduce corruption would directly depend on the degree to which a tradition of 
corruption is well established, and simply raising wages may not be sufficient to eliminate or 
even reduce rent seeking behavior.19 
 
Finally, further constraints, while not explicitly modeled for, may also limit the principal’s 
means of action, such as those arising from externally imposed policy conditionality, and 
limits on the country’s ability to incur debt or increase public sector wages under IMF 
programs. The consequence of these particular constraints is that it may no longer be feasible 
to fulfill ICs as in standard principal-agent models.20 
                                                 
18 High wages may be necessary not only to eradicate corruption, but also to give appropriate 
incentives for performance. For instance, a study on Indonesia shows that it would require 
multiples of current pay levels to get doctors to live in West Papua (Chomitz and others, 
1998). 
19 In general, the higher the costs of investigating and deterring corruption, the more 
corruption we would expect to see in the economy. To see this, consider a cost parameter λ 
that multiplies a general cost of control function of the form Ω(C), where Ω’(C) > 0, Ω”(C) ≥ 
0, Ω (0) = 0, and Ω’(0) = 0, such that the cost of investigating corruption equals λΩ(C). An 
increase in λ, raises the marginal cost of the principal’s control effort, for any given level of 
investigation/monitoring effort chosen by the principal. This leads to a lower level of control 
effort expended, and consequently a higher level of corruption in the economy. 
20 Note that if the principal wanted to induce the agent to devote all his effort to the 
production of the public output, by solely using controls and no performance premiums, the 
(continued…) 
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For these reasons, we do not follow the traditional approach of defining the optimal contract 
using the revelation principle. Instead, we describe the results of our model in light of the 
constraints outlined above. In our model, the only incentive tools available to the principal 
are limited controls and, in an even more limited sense, basic wages. Therefore, the agent’s 
problem is to choose his level of effort—and thus corruption—so as to maximize his utility, 
given the policy parameters (the cost of control and wages), subject to the minimum 
requirement constraint: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 2 2max 1 1 1e E U w e e C eε θ α α= + − + + − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦    (3) 
s.t. 21 e Yθ− + ≥      (MRC) 
 
The principal’s problem is to maximize public output net of wages and control costs, subject 
to the agent’s reaction function above, plus the participation and the budget constraints: 
 
( ) 2,max 1w C E X e w Cθ= − + − −     (4) 
s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) *2 21 1 ,w e e C R uε θ α+ − + + − −Π ≥  (PC) 
 w C B+ ≤  (BC) 
 
 
III.   RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A.   Theoretical Results 
We distinguish between different regimes that can be enforced by the principal depending 
upon the level of control he applies and the wages offered (detailed proofs are provided in the 
Appendix). The optimality of these possible contracts depends on underlying parameter 
values and whether or not the constraints are slack or binding (i.e. hold with equality).  
 
In particular, one crucial question is whether MRC is binding or not. One interpretation for 
the MRC stems from the idea that public agents may be subject to two different 
accountability systems. On the one hand, they are governed by the formal rules and 
institutions associated with the civil service. In our model, these are captured by the controls 
                                                                                                                                                       
IC would be such that: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 2 21 1 1 1w w e e C eε θ ε θ α α+ + ≥ + − + + − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Controls 
would have to satisfy the condition ( ) ( )2 21 / 1C eα ε α⎡ ⎤≥ − − −⎣ ⎦ . As 




lim 1 / 1
e
eα ε α→ ⎡ ⎤− − − = ∞⎣ ⎦ , the principal would need to exert an infinite control effort 
to prevent any rent seeking. 
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and incentive schemes implemented by the principal. On the other, a series of informal rules 
and institutions coexist in all organizations, such as work norms and corporate culture. In 
some developing countries, these informal or indigenous rules may be much more important 
than formal ones. As Dia (1996: 1) notes , “these formal institutions may be at odds with 
societal behavior, expectations, and incentive systems and therefore face a crisis of 
legitimacy and enforcement. Their ineffectiveness is compounded by the absence of the rule 
of law as a third-party enforcement mechanism, engendering a climate in which enforcing 
formal contracts and procedures becomes costly, often prohibitively so, and sanctions for 
deviant behavior are devoid of credibility. By contrast, indigenous institutions anchored in 
local culture and values can count on the sound pillars of legitimacy, accountability, and self-
enforcement. They have a strong hold on people’s commitment, dedication, and sense of 
identity.” It is precisely this “traditional” accountability mechanism between the public 
agents and the population that the minimum requirement constraint, MRC, intends to capture. 
 
Following this interpretation, when MRC is slack, the agent’s formal accountability system, 
i.e. with respect to the official civil service rules, is sufficient, and controls are a relevant 
decision parameter for the principal. Technically speaking, when the MRC is slack, both the 
principal and agent face a real optimization problem: the principal sets the level of controls 
and wages in order to maximize public output, taking into account the agent’s response to its 
own maximization problem. In this case, the more controls exerted by the principal, the less 
effort the agent dedicates to rent seeking activities. A binding MRC, however, implies that 
the agent’s effective accountability is to the population, so that the level of output produced 
is determined only by the implicit social consensus. In such a situation, we show below that it 
is not profitable for the principal to exert any controls. The principal is thus left with no real 
policy instrument to control the agent. 
 
In what follows, we present the main theoretical results predicted by our model, and then 
explain some policy implications. 
 




− −> − , and the agent 









− −= − . 
 
This result suggests that the principal can enforce a regime where MRC is slack only by 
exerting high controls. The agent’s optimal rent seeking effort, which equates the marginal 
benefit of rent seeking to its marginal cost, clearly depends on the principal’s choice of 
control.21 Note that, given our assumptions, the derivatives of *2e  with respect to control costs 
                                                 
21 Recall that an agency problem occurs only if 1 α ε≥ + , otherwise the agent’s and 
principal’s interests are aligned without control. Note also that when the principal exerts 
(continued…) 
 - 14 - 
C, and to the agent’s intrinsic utility from providing the public output ε , are unambiguously 
negative. However, the derivative with respect to the sunk cost to rent seeking (α) may be 
positive if ε  is small, and negative if ε  is large. For an initially low ε , the principal can 
increase the agent’s effort dedicated to the production of the public good only by raising C.22  
 
The optimal levels of control and wages, however, can vary depending upon underlying 
parameter values and the tightness or slackness of other constraints.  
 




























− −= + − −− . 
 
Zero wages may seem like a surprising result, but can be viewed as an extreme case of a 
situation where the principal opts for capitulation wages because it would be too costly to 
provide agents with efficiency wages. However, in general, wages will be positive to help 
satisfy the participation constraint. Note also that the optimal level of controls is lower if the 
budget constraint is binding, which induces the agent into devoting more effort to rent 
capture. Hence, the principal’s expected output will be lower. 
 
As is shown in the appendix, the solution to the problem becomes more complicated if PC is 
initially binding. Generally speaking, to receive political support and have a chance of being 
successfully implemented, reforms should leave its critical implementers with at least as much 
utility as before (Drazen 2000). In our model, this is rendered through the participation 
constraint. However, if PC is initially binding, reforms associated with a reduction of rent 
capture are implementable only if the public agency can be compensated by an increased 
explicit utility. Specifically, we can show that  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
heavy controls, the agent does not engage in rent seeking ( *2lim 0C e→∞ = ), while when control is 
very low and no other constraint interferes, he devotes his entire effort to rent seeking 
( *2 1e = ). 
22 Note that if ε  were an endogenous variable, the principal could also increase the agent’s 
effort devoted to producing the public good by raising ε , as long as 1C α ε> − − . 
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Result 1.2: In a regime where MRC is slack but PC is binding, the principal determines wage 









α εε θ α
− −+ + + =− . The optimal level of wages and 






α ε α ε
α
− − + += <−  and expected output is ( ) ( )( ) *1 1E X uθ ε= + + − ; (ii) if BC 
is binding, the principal should incur a still lower control cost, and expected output is 






− −= + − −− − . 
 
We observe that when more constraints are binding, the principal should exert lower 
controls. Furthermore, the lower the controls, the higher the extent of rent capture by the 
agent, and thus lower the expected output for the principal. However, recall that the optimal 




− −> −  to enforce a regime where MRC is slack. Depending on 
underlying parameter values, it may not be profitable to incur control costs – in which case 
the principal is left with the option of enforcing a regime where MRC is binding. 
 







− −< − + − , with 
*
2 1e Yθ= + − . Optimal control effort is then C* = 0 and (i) if PC is slack, * 0w =  and 
( )E X Y= ; (ii) if PC is binding, ( ) ( )( )* * 1 1 1w u Y α ε α θ= + − − − − + , for *w B≤ , and 
( ) ( ) ( )( )* *1 1E X Y w Y uα ε α θ= − = + + − + − . 
 
Result 2 suggests that in a regime where MRC is binding, it is not profitable for the principal 
to exert any controls (i.e. optimal level of control is 0C = ). Depending on whether PC is 
binding, the principal will have to pay positive wages, otherwise the agent is paid mostly 
through rent capture. One implication of this result is that if the minimum requirement Y  
increases, the agent’s effort dedicated to the production of the public output will also 
increase. However PC must be satisfied, which may require raising wages or a higher 
internal motivation.  
 
Due to the endogenity of C  and 2e  when MRC is slack, comparing the two regimes and 
eliciting the optimal contract is not straightforward. One would need to determine whether it 
is feasible to implement a regime where MRC is slack, which, in turn, depends on whether 
the budget constraint allows for some positive control, such that ( ) ( )21 / 2 1C α ε α⎡ ⎤> − − −⎣ ⎦ . 
Second, whether or not it is efficient to do that would depend upon underlying parameter 
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values. It may, however, be the case that it is less costly not to incur any control cost, and 
enforce a regime where MRC is binding. 
 
B.   Analysis and Implications 
Principal-agent theory suggests that constraints are substitutes for performance incentives 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). The results outlined in the previous section suggest that as 
long as MRC is binding, the principal should pay the lowest wage that satisfies the agent’s 
participation constraint—thereby, ruling out any monetary incentives for performance. More 
important, he should not incur any control cost, thus allowing for possibly large-scale rent 
capture, which is consistent with the results obtained in other models on corruption (Dabla-
Norris, 2002; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000) and may reflect the actual situation in many 
developing countries.23 Nevertheless, due to our MRC assumption, the extent of rent capture 
will be mitigated by a “ceiling” of what is socially acceptable as part of the implicit 
consensus between the agent and the population. 
 
In practice, MRC may be binding in some developing countries, in particular those 
characterized by a divergence between formal and informal rules and institutions, as is the 
case in many Sub-Saharan African countries (Dia, 1996). In these countries, it is often the 
case that adherence to civil service rules is weak and formal controls are ineffective (notably 
because the legal system is not credible), so that accountability to official rules is 
concomitantly weak. At the same time, informal rules, such as those captured by the social 
consensus, are probably respected. In such a situation, the only effective accountability 
mechanism is an implicit consensus between the agent and the population. 
  
The above results also suggest that the principal can hope to get a better public outcome 
(over the minimum requirement) only if MRC is slack. This is the case when controls are 
sufficiently high.24 Other things being equal, increasing C  will align the agent’s interest with 
that of the principal, making it optimal for the agent to decrease rent seeking. However, the 
principal will still need to respect the agent’s participation constraint. This implies that 
reforms which desire to reduce corruption will necessitate raising concomitantly the agent’s 
utility, provided that the budget constraint allows for it. The low level of public sector wages 
in developing and transition countries is often posited as a cause of corruption. In cross-
                                                 
23 Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), for instance, note that corruption arises as part of an 
optimal allocation of government activities when there are incomplete contracts and 
incentive problems. 
24 Note that increasing controls may take different forms. Public expenditure management 
encompasses different types of control, including internal and external, ex ante and ex post, 
centralized and decentralized, compliance and performance controls. The design of the 
control function is an important question which is not dealt with in this paper (see Leruth and 
Paul [forthcoming] on that issue). 
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country regressions, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find evidence of a statistically 
significant relationship between relative civil service pay and corruption. However, Rauch 
and Evans (2000) find that the level and change in bureaucratic compensation relative to the 
private sector are not statistically significant determinants of different measures of 
bureaucratic performance. Similarly, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2002) argue that when 
control mechanisms are weak, wages do not have any impact on corruption. 
 
The persistence of corruption in developing and transition countries could also reflect the fact 
that the constraints described in our model are binding simultaneously. This is indeed 
suggested by the literature, and seems to reflect the reality of many developing and transition 
countries. First, the minimum requirement constraint will be binding unless the agent has 
sufficient incentives to exert a high productive effort, either due to internal motivation to 
perform or to the risk of being punished if caught engaging in corrupt activities. As we have 
already argued, both these types of incentives may be lacking in many developing countries. 
Second, the participation constraint might be binding, if the principal lacks the ability to offer 
sufficient incentives to induce an efficient level of effort. Our model predicts that when MRC 
is binding, it is inefficient to exert any controls, so that the principal should offer the lowest 
wage that fulfills the PC.25 Moreover, it can also be the case that due to repeated interactions, 
the population and the public agent reach a social consensus, setting Y  and *u  such that 
MRC and PC are binding simultaneously. Third, the government’s budget constraint can be 
very tight in many developing and transition countries, due to the inefficiency of fiscal 
administrations, IFI conditionality which places limits on the wage bill, and numerous 
competing needs in terms of public expenditure. 
 
If BC was slack, increasing the public outcome could be achieved by an appropriate mix of 
controls to reduce rent capture and wages to satisfy the participation constraint. Technically 
speaking, this would equate to introducing some type of incentive compatibility constraint. 
However, as discussed above, in reality the existence of a binding budget constraint, and 
possibly other constraints not explicitly accounted for in our framework (for example, due to the 
local political processes, or external pressures from IFIs and donors), prevent the provision of 
adequate incentives in many cases. Furthermore, when MRC is binding, the only way by which 
the principal can get a higher public output is by raising the minimum requirement level Y, 
which is not a direct policy instrument, but considered exogenous in our model. The principal’s 
problem therefore seems unsolvable. In the next section, we examine alternative ways to get the 
equilibrium to move in a direction favorable to the public interest when traditional incentives 
are unavailable. 
 
                                                 
25 Note, however, that in reality one generally observes some positive controls. This could 
render two cases: either the principal does not choose the optimal level of control when MRC 
is binding due to political or externally imposed constraints, or MRC is binding at the agent’s 
optimal level of rent capture, i.e. *2 1e =  (corner solution). 
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IV.   THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY 
In this paper, we have presented the problem of rent seeking as an agency problem, arising 
from diverging interests and asymmetric information between a public agency and its 
principal (representing the public interest). We have argued that the principal cannot 
disentangle between the effort dedicated by the agent to the production of the public good, 
and some external factors, unless it exerts costly controls. In this section, we examine the role 
of transparency in reducing the agency problem presented above. While we do not explicitly 
model the effect of transparency in our framework, we illustrate different ways through 
which the provision, diffusion and use of information, both within and outside the agency, 
may contribute to reduced rent capture and higher public output. We highlight the role of 
transparency on two of the model’s constraints, namely the minimum requirement constraint, 
MRC, and the participation constraint, PC. We also examine the second-order effect of 
transparency on the budget constraint, BC, and other indirect political and social effects. In 
line with our analytical approach, we present some arguments and justify them with 
supporting empirical evidence.  
 
The literature suggests various ways in which greater transparency may reduce the 
information asymmetry between principals and agents, thereby improving the public 
outcome. On the theoretical side, Holmström (1979) has shown that in moral hazard 
principal-agent problems, more information about the agent makes him more accountable to 
the principal. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the lack of transparency and of 
effective institutional controls are the main factors leading to corruption in areas of spending 
decisions such as investment projects and procurement spending. For instance, Broadman 
and Recanatini (2002) argue that a well-established system of market institutions, including 
clear and transparent rules and fully functioning checks and balances, reduces opportunities 
for rent seeking and hence incentives for corruption. In cross-country regressions, Brunetti 
and Weder (2003) and Ahrend (2002) show that a free press may be a powerful control on 
corruption, and that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower 
corruption. 
 
Note that it may be the case that corruption and transparency are jointly determined. For 
instance, poor transparency may lead to a higher level of corruption as the public official has 
greater discretionary power. On the other hand, widespread corruption may lead to poor 
transparency, as corrupt agents, reluctant to be exposed, attempt to weaken information flows 
within the public agency. Kaufman and others (2002), however, find that even controlling for 
the potential endogenity between the two, greater transparency of decisions in personnel, 
budget management, and service delivery can have a significant negative effect on 
corruption. 
 
A.   Effect on the Minimum Requirement Constraint 
Increased transparency can have an impact on the minimum requirement constraint by raising 
the minimum public output required from the agent. From our model’s perspective, we can 
view transparency as improving the observability of θ  and 2e  by the public. It is now widely 
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recognized that increasing citizens’ voice can enhance government accountability, and “for 
the expanded ‘voice’ strategy to be effective, it is essential to improve transparency of 
government action” (World Bank 2000, p. 91). For instance, raising public awareness or 
access to information on the working of public programs could make it easier for citizens to 
demand certain standards and monitor abuses by public officials. This, in turn, would compel 
the agent to reduce rent capture and increase the effort dedicated to the production of the 
public output. In our model, as long as MRC is binding, this would be the most effective way 
to improve the principal’s situation.  
 
In a series of empirical studies on the importance of transparency for public funds, Reinikka 
and Svensson (2004, 2005) argue that corruption can be effectively tackled only when the 
reform of the political process and the restructuring of the regulatory systems are 
complemented by a systematic effort to increase the citizens’ ability to monitor and challenge 
abuses of the system, and to inform citizens about their rights and entitlements. In practice, 
the IMF’s Code on Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, and the adherence to standards 
in the form of country ROSCs (Reviews of Standards and Codes), envisage a similar role for 
fiscal transparency.26 Petrie (2003) notes too that in addition to providing a means for 
governments to assess and build their capacity for fiscal management, “it is also anticipated 
that fiscal transparency may, over time, enhance oversight by civil society and the public of 
the conduct of fiscal management.”  
 
The effect of transparency in raising the “minimum requirement” in our model could be due, 
for instance, to increased bargaining power in the hands of the population when negotiating 
the social consensus. Recent empirical evidence indeed suggests that transparency can play 
such a determining role. Reinnika and Svensson (2005) evaluate the effects of increased 
public access to information as a tool to reduce corruption and capture of public funds in 
Uganda. They find that the extent of corruption appears to have less to do with conventional 
audit and supervision mechanisms, and more to do with the citizen’s opportunity to voice 
their claims for the funds, and their relative bargaining positions. At the same time, greater 
transparency of action may reduce the agent’s will to engage in rent seeking activities – for 
instance, it could serve to reduce the pressure exerted by civil servants’ family and clientele 
networks to capture rents in order to redistribute them. 
 
B.   Effect on the Participation Constraint 
Transparency may help relax the participation constraint in several ways. For instance, more 
transparent merit-based procedures for hiring and internal promotion may increase the utility 
derived by the agent from internal motivation (ε). Other things equal, this could allow for 
                                                 
26 Fiscal transparency “should lead to a better informed public debate about the design and 
results of fiscal policy, make governments more accountable for their implementation of 
fiscal policy, and thereby strengthen credibility and public understanding of macroeconomic 
policies and choices” (IMF Survey 1998, p. 122). 
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lower rent capture, while satisfying the participation constraint. Moynihan and Pandey 
(2005) show that creating an environment which allows employees to feel that they are 
contributing to the public good increases public service motivation. In addition, there is some 
evidence to suggest that nonmonetary incentives may actually serve to reduce corruption. In 
a cross-country study, Rauch and Evans (2000) find that meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion are statistically significant determinants of good bureaucratic performance, while 
the effect of competitive salaries on bureaucratic quality is unclear. Using survey-level data, 
Recanatini et al (2005) find that basing personnel decisions on criteria of merit and 
professional competence are associated with lower corruption in public agencies. 
 
Transparency, in the form of better quality and timely provision of fiscal data and limits on 
the use of extrabudgetary procedures, can facilitate the control function and increase 
penalties for rent extraction. Practitioners frequently relate lack of transparency and 
accountability to poor enforceability of existing rules (Campos and Pradhan, 1996), which 
undermines the control function and allows for corruption (Moussa, 2004; Lienert, 2003). In 
our model, this would translate into a higher C , and thus a higher expected penalty. As a 
result, when MRC is slack, the effort dedicated to rent seeking ( *2e ) would accordingly be 
lower.  
 
Finally, our model captures the idea that rent-seeking activities are socially costly, because of 
the sunk cost α  associated with concealing them. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the 
illegality of corruption and the attendant need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and 
costly (than taxation), since it induces a substitution into goods on which bribes can be more 
easily collected without detection. Transparency may act in opposing ways on α . On the one 
hand, one could argue that greater transparency increases the cost of concealing corruption, and 
thus has a negative effect on PC. Alternatively, one could also argue that transparency, by 
making rules more clear and secure, could help improve the “industrial organization” of rent 
seeking. However, to the extent that transparency reduces the cost of enforcement, on balance, 
its effect would be to relax PC and help improve the principal’s situation. 
C.   Effect on the Budget Constraint 
Reducing 2e  through increased controls is costly, and keeping an initially binding PC 
satisfied would require increasing wages, hence, the importance of relaxing BC . As 
discussed above, greater transparency can ease the government’s control function; 
conversely, at a given level of effectiveness, it reduces the cost of control and thus relaxes the 
budget constraint. More generally, relaxing the budget constraint calls for looking for fiscal 
space, i.e. in its broadest sense, “the availability of budgetary room that allows a government 
to provide resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to sustainability of a 
government’s financial position” (Heller, 2005).  
 
There are different ways in which a government can create fiscal space: tax policy measures 
and strengthening of tax administration, reprioritization of expenditures, government 
borrowing, and foreign aid. Transparency can have important second-order effects on the 
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budget constraint. It can improve the efficiency of the tax administration and lower discretion 
and interference in revenue forecasting and collections. Danninger and others (2005) find 
that a high degree of transparency in revenue forecasting, as measured by publicly available 
information on revenue forecasts and participation of nongovernment agencies in the 
forecasting process, reduces government interference and governance-related problems in 
revenue collection. A higher degree of transparency in budget management can make it 
easier to conduct intersectoral comparisons, thereby facilitating the elaboration of medium-
term expenditure frameworks and the prioritization of expenditure. Moreover, it can improve 
lenders’ and donors’ trust, thus improving loan opportunities and increasing aid flows, and 
possibly convince donors to rely more on efficient channels for managing aid, such as budget 
support (Leruth and Paul, 2006). 
 
D.   Other Effects of Transparency 
In addition to the effects on our model’s constraints outlined above, transparency can have 
other indirect, but important effects. At the political level, Robinson and Verdier (2002) 
argue that inefficient practices such as clientelism and gift exchanges arise from politicians’ 
inability to commit to more efficient policies. In a similar vein, Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) and 
Keefer (2005) note that the inability of political competitors in young democracies to make 
credible promises to citizens, explains why younger democracies are more corrupt, and 
exhibit weaker rule of law and lower levels of bureaucratic quality. Transparency of fiscal 
actions can enhance politicians’ ability to commit to development-oriented policies, thereby 
reducing incentives for inefficient practices. In the longer term, transparency might help 
reduce social polarization, which is a determinant of the incentives of government to provide 
public services (Easterly, 2001). For example, one study of Bolivia emphasizes the 
importance of transparency in the depoliticization process and in facilitating political 
consensus building (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Davis (2004) notes that the two concomitant drivers of reduced corruption in public service 
delivery are a shift in the accountability networks of service providers, and a change in the 
work environment that increases the moral cost of misconduct. The first relates to the issue of 
beneficiaries’ voice and civil servant accountability. The latter relates to the internal 
motivation of a bureaucrat and social effects, which have been shown to play an important 
role in determining individual attitudes toward corruption (Andvig and Moene, 1990; Tirole, 
1996; and Gatti and others, 2003). The presence of these social effects, in turn, implies that 
incentives to fight corruption at the individual level can be low. Therefore, from a policy 
perspective, the existence of social effects implies that an effective fight against corruption 
often requires social sanctions against engaging in such activities. Transparency has a role to 
play in building and enabling anticorruption social effects. 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
Despite considerable reform attempts, many developing and transition countries continue to 
be characterized by pervasive and persistent rent capture, misgovernance, and public sector 
inefficiency. Country case studies and the existing literature advance different explanations 
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and policy prescriptions, but most theoretical models and empirical studies generally focus 
on restricted aspects of the problem. In this paper, we develop a stylized analytical 
framework that reflects some realistic constraints faced by governments in these economies. 
In particular, we argue that this persistence reflects a stable equilibrium, resting on a social 
consensus among the different stakeholders. We augment existing principal-agent models of 
corruption by introducing a “minimum requirement constraint” and a budget constraint. 
However, in contrast to standard models, we do not specify incentive compatibility 
constraints, because of the failure of traditional incentives in many of these countries. 
 
We argue that the ineffectiveness of traditional incentives in countering rent seeking, in 
conjunction with multiple binding constraints, can explain the persistence of corruption and 
policy distortions in these countries. In such an environment, we argue that “external” factors 
(to direct policy incentives, tools generally considered as decision variables in principal-
agent models) can play an important role in improving public outcomes. In particular, we 
examine the role of greater transparency—information production, disclosure, as well as the 
means to use it—in ameliorating the various constraints that impair public sector 
management, and as a result, assist in achieving better social outcomes. We summarize the 
evidence from existing empirical studies to illustrate how transparency can act at different 
levels: increasing the voice and bargaining power of the population vis-à-vis the agency, 
improving public agents’ internal and public service motivations, facilitating controls, 
relaxing the budget constraint, and ameliorating the political environment. All of these can 
contribute to improving public services and outcomes. 
 
Our analysis suggests that transparency is central for civil service, public expenditure, and 
fiscal management reforms, and provides a rationale for external donors, including IFIs, to 
promote greater transparency in the fiscal and political arenas. In addition to providing 
reforming governments with a credible “technology of commitment” to reforms (Devarajan 
and others, 2001), external partners may have an important role to play in promoting 
transparency in developing and transition countries. Donors could, for instance, reinforce 
citizens’ voice, provide additional funds to relax the budget constraint (notably, for 
increasing basic wages in the public sector), and foster a more transparent public sector. IFIs, 
in particular, can direct their actions toward increasing fiscal transparency, both for 
facilitating the control of public funds and for providing information for citizens to exert their 
voice. Accrued benefits from fostering greater transparency should progressively push the 
high rent-seeking equilibrium toward one associated with better public outcomes. 
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Principal and Agent’s Maximization Problems 
 
I. Agent’s Maximization Problem 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 2 2max 1 1 1e E U w e e C eε θ α α= + − + + − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
s.t. 21 e Yθ− + ≥  (MRC) 
 
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1L w e e C e e Y µ eε θ α α λ θ= + − + + − − − + − + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
which gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:  
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− −≥ −  to 
implement a regime where MRC is slack. 
 
 
If, however, 0λ > , MRC is binding and 2 1MRe Yθ= + − . From (1), we know that 
( )2 21 2 1µ C eλ α ε α+ = − − − − . Two cases may arise: (i) 0µ > , which implies that 2 1e = , and 
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Yθ = ; (ii) more realistically, 0µ =  and ( ) ( )21 2 1 1C Yλ α ε α θ= − − − − + − . As 0λ > , this 







− −< − + − . 
 
Furthermore, the expected penalty if MRC is slack can be written as: 
 
[ ] ( ) 222 1, 1 14 1C R C e C
εα α
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The expected penalty if MRC is binding is given by: 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )( )2 22, 1 1 1C R C e C Yα α θΠ = − = − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
 
Therefore, the agent’s utility when MRC is slack or binding, respectively, simplifies to: 
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II. Principal’s Maximization Problem 
 
( ) 2,max 1w C E X e w Cθ= − + − −  
s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) *2 21 1 ,w e e C R uε θ α+ − + + − −Π ≥  (PC) 
 w C B+ ≤  (BC) 
 
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]*2 1 2 2 21 1 1 ,L e w C w e e C R u B w Cθ λ ε θ α λ⎡ ⎤= − + − − + + − + + − −Π − + − −⎣ ⎦  
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem can be written as: 
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Note that (3) implies that 0w >  only if 1 0λ > , i.e. only if PC is binding (then, 1 21λ λ= + ). 
Similarly, (2) implies that 0C >  only if ( )2 1 1 21 1 1eC Cλ α ε λ λ
∂ ∂Π− − − = + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ . Two cases are 
possible according to the agent’s reaction function. 
 
(A) If MRC is binding: 2 1
MRe Yθ= + −  
 
Substituting into (2), we get: 1 21 0
L
C C
λ λ∂ ∂Π= − − − ≤∂ ∂  and 0
LC
C
∂ =∂ , with 
( ) ( )( )2 221 1 1 0P e YC α α θ
∂ = − = − + − ≥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂ . 
 
This implies that the principal will not exert controls (C = 0) and (2) holds with strict inequality. 
Two sub-cases are then possible: 
 
(i) If PC is slack: 1 0λ =  and from (3) * 0w = . The agent’s utility is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1U Y Y Yε α θ α θ α ε= + − + − = − + − − − , and expected public output is 
( )E X Y= . 
 
(ii) If PC is binding: 1 0λ >  and 0w > ; the principal increases wages until 
( ) ( )( )* * 1 1 1w u Y α ε α θ= + − − − − + , if this is compatible with BC ( i.e. if *w B≤ ). Expected 
public output is given by ( ) ( ) ( )( )* *1 1E X Y w Y uα ε α θ= − = + + − + − . 
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This gives rise to two possible sub-cases. 
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(i) If PC is slack, 1 0λ = , and from (3), we have * 0w = . The agent’s utility is given by 
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Note that the control cost when BC is binding is obviously lower than when it is not. Therefore, 
the agent will choose a higher level of rent capture when BC is binding. 
 
(ii) If PC is binding, 1 0λ >  and (notwithstanding corner solutions) * 0w > . The principal then 









α εε θ α
− −+ + + =− . 
 
(a) If BC is slack, 2 0λ = , and from (3) we get 1 1λ = . From (2), we get 




2 12 1 CC
α ε α ε
αα
⎡ ⎤− − − −= + ⎢ ⎥−− ⎣ ⎦






α ε α ε
α
− − + += − . 
 
By assumption, to have an agency problem, 1α ε+ < . Therefore, *** *C C< , which implies that 
the control cost when PC is binding is lower than when it is slack. Therefore, the agent will 
choose a higher level of rent capture when PC is binding. 
 






α εε θ α α ε
− −= − + − − + + . 
Substituting these values of C and w, and simplifying, we can show that expected output is 
( ) ( )( ) *1 1E X uθ ε= + + − . 
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C
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α ε α ε λ α εα ε λα α λ α
⎡ ⎤− − − − − − −− − = + ⇔ =⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, so that 







α ε λ α ε
α λ





λ α ε< ≤ − − , we can show that 
**** *C C<  and **** ***C C< , which implies 
that a binding BC reduces the control by the principal, which in turn implies higher rent capture 
by the agent. 
 
Furthermore, from PC, we get  







2 1 2 / 1
w u
α εε θ α λ α ε
− −= − + − − − − − .  
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